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Abstract 
A simple open economy asset pricing model can account for the house price and current 
account dynamics in the G7 over the years 2001-2008. The model features rational 
households, but assumes that households entertain subjective beliefs about price behavior and 
update these using Bayes’ rule. The resulting beliefs dynamics considerably propagate 
economic shocks and crucially contribute to replicating the empirical evidence. Belief 
dynamics can temporarily delink house prices from fundamentals, so that low interest rates 
can fuel a house price boom. House price booms, however, are not necessarily synchronized 
across countries and the model correctly predicts the heterogeneous response of house prices 
across the G7, following the fall in real interest rates at the beginning of the millennium. The 
response to interest rates depends sensitively on agents’ beliefs at the time of the interest rate 
reduction, which are a function of the prior history of disturbances hitting the economy. 
According to the model, the US house price boom could have been largely avoided, if real 
interest rates had decreased by less after the year 2000. 
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We present a stylized open economy asset pricing model with rationally investing
households that can quantitatively replicate the house price dynamics in the G7
economies over the years 2001-2008, as well as the associated dynamics of the
current account.
In our model, boom and bust dynamics in house prices are triggered by
macro-fundamentals, e.g., changes in real interest rates or housing preferences,
but as in the data the link to these fundamentals is not necessarily immediate.
Also similar to the data, price booms in our model are associated with an
expansion of the housing stock, a deterioration of the current account, and a
1consumption boom, while the subsequent house price declines are accompanied
by current account improvements and subdued consumption.
To study the relationship between house price movements, housing construc-
tion, consumption and international borrowing, we generalize the closed econ-
omy asset pricing models developed previously in Adam and Marcet (2010a,
2010b) and Adam Marcet and Nicolini (2010) along three dimensions. First,
we consider a setting with two assets, namely a domestically traded risky asset
- the housing stock - and an internationally traded riskless bond. Second, we
newly incorporate a borrowing constraint that limits household leverage and the
overall amount of borrowing, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Third, we
consider a production economy with endogenous asset supply by explicitly incor-
porating a construction sector. Despite these extensions our model is relatively
parsimonious.
The quantitative success of the model crucially rests on the assumption that
we allow for households that are uncertain about how house prices relate to
economic fundamentals. Similar to academic economists, our households fail to
know exactly, what is the correct model linking house prices with fundamentals.
We incorporate this feature by putting to work the concept of ‘internal ratio-
nality’, as developed previously in Adam and Marcet (2010a, 2010b). Internally
rational investors are utility maximizers in the standard sense and entertain fully
speciﬁed and dynamically consistent beliefs about all payoﬀ-relevant variables
that are external to them (including competitive market prices). Internally ra-
tional agents, however, do not fully understand how market prices are formed,
so that their subjective probability distribution about prices may not be ex-
actly equal to the true equilibrium distribution. Nevertheless, agents’ beliefs
are assumed to be close to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) beliefs
typically attributed to agents in the literature.
Given agents’ subjective uncertainty about price, optimal behavior implies
that they update beliefs about house price behavior by applying Bayes’ rule
to market outcomes. Agents’ price beliefs thus become a state variable and
(Bayesian) learning giving rise to a dynamic feedback between price beliefs and
actual price outcomes. As we show, this generates a considerable amount of
additional propagation in the model and can fuel boom and bust dynamics in
housing prices. This is of interest because the momentum in house price changes
t h a tc a nb eo b s e r v e di nt h ed a t ah a sp r o v e nd i ﬃcult to explain with the help
of rational expectations models, see Glaeser and Gyourko (2006). Therefore,
Glaeser et al. (2008) previously suggested that models of learning can help
resolving this empirical puzzle.
Learning about price dynamics turns out to be important for explaining the
persistent rise and fall in house prices occurring over the years 2001-2008 in
the G7. Our model thereby suggests that the strong fall in real interest rates
after the year 2000 contributed signiﬁcantly to the subsequent housing boom
in some of the G7 economies. In line with the empirical evidence, however, the
model predicts that these movements are not necessarily synchronized across
countries. While some G7 countries experienced house price booms (US, UK,
Canada, Italy, France), they did so to very diﬀerent degrees, and some coun-
2tries (Japan, Germany) even displayed stagnant house prices over this period.
The model successfully replicates this heterogeneity because the predicted house
price evolution is highly dependent on agents’ price beliefs at the time of the
interest rate reduction, which in turn depend on the (adverse) shocks hitting
the respective economies prior to the fall in the real rate.
Our learning model is also compatible with observed house price expecta-
tions. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use the Michigan Survey of Consumers to
document that the share of agents believing prices to increase further comoves
positively with the house price level over the last housing boom. Speciﬁcally,
the share of optimistic agents reached its peak precisely at the time when house
prices peaked. This fact is consistent with the learning we propose.
The paper also suggests important policy lessons. Since the world interest
rate is an exogenous parameter in the model, we can study the eﬀects of alterna-
tive interest rate scenarios. For the U.S. economy, the model predicts that the
recent US house price boom would have been largely avoided and the current
account been considerably smaller, if interest rates had fallen by less at the be-
ginning of the 2000’s. Although such a link between real interest rates and house
price booms is frequently discussed in the press1, to the best of our knowledge
we present the ﬁrst formal model in which a sizable and persistent house price
boom can arise from a persistent reduction in the level of real interest rates.2
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature on house price ﬂuctuations and current account dynamics. Section 3
presents stylized facts we seek to explain about the behavior of house prices, the
current account and private consumption in the G7. Section 4 introduces a styl-
ized open economy model, derives the household optimality conditions and the
equations determining the equilibrium outcomes for a general set of subjective
price beliefs. In section 5 we show that the model has diﬃculties in replicating
salient features of the data under rational expectations (RE). Section 6 intro-
duces subjective price beliefs that are close to the REE beliefs (in distribution).
In section 7 we show how the learning model can qualitatively account for the
observed dynamics in house prices, current accounts and consumption in the G7.
Sections 8 and 9 then explore the quantitative model performance. A conclusion
brieﬂy summarizes.
2 Related Literature
Few papers study house price dynamics within dynamic macroeconomic models
before the recent recession. Important exceptions are Iacoviello (2005), who de-
velops a monetary business cycle model with housing and collateral constraints,
and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) who study the role of house prices and
1E.g., The Economist (August 23, 2007): ’Does America need a recession?’, Economic
Focus.
2Himmelberg et al. (2005) show that with low real interest rates a further reduction in
rates can give rise to a large house price increase under rational expectations. It fails, however,
to give rise to a persistent sequence of house price increases.
3housing collateral for the pricing of stocks.
A variety of recent papers use models of learning to explain observed house
price data. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), for example, present a
model in which a temporary house price boom emerges from infectious optimism
that eventually dissipates once investors become more certain about fundamen-
tals.
Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) present a model in which aggregate wealth
ﬂuctuates because agents learn about the expected future productivity of capital
goods. Positive news about future productivity is shown to generate an increase
in asset prices, a consumption boom and a current account deﬁcit. The small
volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals, however, poses problem for such news
driven explanations of asset price ﬂuctuations.
Other papers also account for some of the empirical features that we de-
scribe. Matsuyama (1990) provides a theoretical analysis of the income eﬀect of
government spending, housing subsidies and sector-speciﬁc productivity change
on residential investment and the current account. He shows that anticipated
government spending shocks lead to a decline in house prices and residential
investment, but that the eﬀect on the current account depends on whether
housing and nondurable consumption are substitutes or complements. Punzi
(2006) evaluates the quantitative impact of the housing market on the current
account using a two-sector, two-country DSGE model with heterogenous agents
and a housing collateral constraint. In her setup, housing preference shocks gen-
erate a negative correlation between house prices and the current account. Gete
(2010) seeks to explain current account and housing price dynamics through
cross-country heterogeneity in the evolution of housing demand. If the desire
to smooth consumption across housing services and nondurable consumption
goods is strong or if households’ preferences feature low intra-temporal substi-
tution elasticity, then an increase in housing demand can give rise to a house
price increase and a current account deﬁcit.
3 Stylized Facts
3.1 U.S. House Prices and the Current Account 1996-2008
A variety of house price measures indicate that house prices in the United States
increased considerably over the years 1996-2006. Figure 1 depicts indices of the
real house price (RHP),the price-to-income (PIR) ratio, and the price-to-rent
(PRR) ratio normalizing indices to a value of 100 in the year 1996.3 Prices
increased - depending on the preferred house price measure - between 24% and
58% in the subsequent 10 years. While house prices started increasing well
before the year 2000, all house price measures indicate that over 70% of the
total increase takes place after the year 2000.
3The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Tables 59 and


























Figure 1: United State: House Price Measures and the Current Account
Figure 1 also depicts the U.S. current account deﬁcit (in % of GDP).4 The
current account and the house price are strongly negatively associated over time,
with the deﬁcit widening considerably throughout the period 1996 - 2006, except
for a slight and temporary improvement in the recession year 2001. Once house
prices started to revert direction in the years 2007 and 2008, however, the U.S.
current account deﬁcit also started to narrow, a development that accelerated
in the year 2009 (see the current account data in table 1 below).
Table 1 below reports the annual change in the value of the U.S. housing
stock (at market prices), together with the size of the current account deﬁcit.5
The bottom row in the table reveals a surprising fact: in the period 1996-2005,
any 1$ increase in the value of the U.S. housing stock was on average associated
with a 0.26$ increase in international borrowing in the form of a current account
deﬁcit. This ratio was remarkably stable in this period (the standard deviation
is just 0.04), but breaks down after 2006 when current account deﬁcits improve
only mildly, despite the domestic housing value either increasing less strongly
(in 2006) or decreasing substantially (after 2007).
4The data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Table 51.
5The change in housing value is computed using the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds
Statistics, Table B.100, Release 2010-12-9. The current account numbers are taken from NIPA
















Figure 2: United States: Ex-ante real mortgage rate
Y e a r :9 69 79 89 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9
Value change
U.S. house stock +0.4 +0.5 +0.9 +1.0 +1.7 +1.4 +1.3 +1.7 +2.6 +3.5 +1.0 -1.7 -3.8 -0.8
(vs prev. year,
trn dollars)
U.S. CA deﬁ cit 114 129 205 292 410 392 452 516 625 741 798 717 670 380
(bn dollars)
CA deﬁ cit / ch. 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.84 -0.41 -0.18 -0.45
in house value
Table 1: U.S. Housing Value Appreciation and the Current Account
3.2 U.S.: Real Rates, Consumption, and Construction
The house price and current account developments in the U.S. highlighted in the
previous section were accompanied by a number of other broad macroeconomic
trends that we now describe. We thereby focus on three variables, namely the
behavior of real interest rates, private consumption and construction activity
The acceleration of the U.S. house price increase and the widening of current
account deﬁcits after the years 2000/2001 coincided with a considerable fall in
ex-ante real interest rates. Figure 2 illustrates this fact, by depicting the one year




















Figure 3: United States: House Price Changes and Consumption Growth
CPI inﬂation rate from the survey of professional forecasters.6 The ﬁgure shows
that ex-ante real interest rates considerably dropped around the beginning of
2001 and stayed low for an extended period of time, before rising again around
the year 2006. Overall, real interest rates display considerably less persistence
than real house prices. While real interest rates completed a full cycle over the
years 1996-2006, house prices steadily increased throughout this period. It thus
appears far from immediate to establish a close link between house prices and
real interest rates in the data.
To capture the interest rate evolution in a stylized way, we consider three
subperiods: a period with relatively high real rates over the years 1996-2000, a
period with relatively low real rates over the years 2001-2005, and a period of
moderately high rates in the years 2006-2008. The horizontal lines in ﬁgure 2
indicate the average interest rate for each of these subperiods.
Figure 3 depicts real private consumption growth together with various mea-
sures of house price growth.7 Private consumption expanded over the years
1996-2006 by more than 3% each year, but came down after house prices re-
verted direction in 2007 and 2008. As has been documented before, there is
thus a positive association between house price and consumption growth in the
data.
The number of new houses built in the U.S. also strongly expanded over the
period 1996-2006. Figure 4 reports the number of new housing units completed
in the U.S. together with various house price measures.8 The ﬁgure shows that
6T h em o r t g a g er a t ei st h e’ 1 - y e a ra d j u s t a b l er a t em o r t g a g ea v e r a g ei nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s ’
from Freddie Mac (SeriesID: MORTGAGE1US).
7The real private consumption growth data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No.87,
2010, Annex Table 3. The house price series employ the same data as used for ﬁgure 1.


























Figure 4: United States: House Prices and New Housing Completions
the level of house prices and the number of housing completions are strongly
positively correlated.
3.3 Cross-Sectional Evidence from G7 Economies
The facts documented for the U.S. Economy in the previous section, appear in
similar form in the cross section of G7 economies.9
Table 2 below shows that over the period 2001-2007 house price increases
and current account surpluses are negatively correlated in the cross-section of
G7 countries.10 Countries with larger house price booms thus tended to have
also larger current account deﬁcits. This holds independently of the considered
house price measure (RHP, PIR, PRR). Furthermore, house price increases are
strongly positively correlated with real private consumption growth over the
same period, showing that countries with larger house price booms also tended
to have larger consumption booms. Finally, as shown in table 3, the house price
reversals in 2007-2008 are similarly strongly negatively correlated with changes
in the current account surplus. These cross-sectional relationships are consistent
with the correlation over time that can observed for U.S. data.
Although the G7 evidence conﬁrms the comovements between house price,
current account and consumption dynamics documented for the U.S., there
housing units completed’. The house price series are the same as the ones shown in ﬁgure 1.
9Data limitations prevent us from discussing the behavior of new housing construction or
the relationship between value changes of the housing stock and the current account for all
G7 countries.
10Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) also provide evidence on the strong positive association


















Figure 5: Real house prices in the G7 (indices, normalized: 100 in year 2000)
exists a considerable amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity across the G7
economies. Figure 5 illustrates this fact by depicting the real house price indices
for the G7 economies, normalizing the house price indices to 100 for the year
2000.11 It is clear that house prices show high volatility and high persistence in
all countries. Table 4 documents the latter facts by reporting the average serial
correlation of housing prices over time across the G7 countries.
Importantly, however, the large low frequency movements in house prices are
not synchronized across countries. While four countries experienced sustained
house price increases, even larger ones than those experience in the U.S. after
the year 2000, Japan and Germany witnessed real price decreases.
11The ﬁgure looks very similar when depicting instead the the price-to-rent ratio or the
price-to-income ratio.
9Current Account Real Priv. Cons.
Surplus Increase
House Price (2001-07, cum. sum (2001-2007,
Change 2001-07 in % of GDP) cum. sum in % )
Real house price -0.55 0.72
Price-rent ratio -0.42 0.75
Price-income ratio -0.52 0.61
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Correlations in the G7
Change in Current Account Surplus
2008 vs. 2007








real house prices 0.98
price-to-rent ratio 0.97
price-to-income 0.97
Table 4: Autocorrelation of G7 House Prices
104 A nO p e nE c o n o m yM o d e lw i t hH o u s i n g
This section introduces a small open economy model with endogenous housing
supply in which households can internationally borrow for consumption and
investment purposes. Household borrowing is thereby subject to a borrowing
constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Preferences and Beliefs. We consider an economy populated by a unit
mass of utility maximizing households. Households are identical in terms of







t (ξtht + ct) (1)
where ct ≥ 0 denotes consumption of goods, ht ≥ 0 consumption of housing
services, δ ∈ (0,1) t h et i m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,a n dξt > 0 a housing preference
shock. We assume that the preference shock evolves according to
lnξt =l nξt−1 +l nεt (2)
with εt being an iid innovation satisfying E[lnεt]=0and E[(lnεt)
2]=σ2
ε.T h e
preference ξt shock captures changes in the population’s preferences for housing
services relative to consumption.
The household’s expectation in (1) is computed using a (potentially subjec-
tive) probability measure P, which is deﬁned over the space of payoﬀ-relevant
outcomes Ω. The measure P assigns probabilities to all Borel subsets of Ω,s o
that agents entertain a standard probability space (P,B,Ω),w i t hB denoting the
sigma-algebra containing all Borel. Importantly, the set Ω includes all sequences
of payoﬀ-relevant variables that agents take as given. This includes fundamen-
tal shocks, but also competitive market prices. Agents’ choices in some period
t are then functions of the realization of these payoﬀ-relevant variables up to
t.W h i l et h em e a s u r eP itself is time-invariant, i.e., dynamically consistent, it
will often imply that rational agents are learning about the house price process.
This is the case, for example, if P is generated by a model that agents entertain
about the stochastic process of house prices and by some prior beliefs about un-
known parameters describing this process. Further details about the underlying
probability space is given in section 4.1 below.
Budget Constraint and Collateral Constraint. We let Ht ≥ 0 denote
the stock of houses owned by the household in period t. The housing stock
yields housing services ht according to
ht = G(Ht) (3)
12As explained in Adam and Marcet (2010b), common knowledge of agents’ preferences and
beliefs might place additional restrictions on the house price beliefs that rational agents can
entertain.
11for some twice continuously diﬀerentiable and (weakly) concave function G(·)
satisfying the conditions limH→0 G0(H)=∞ and limH→H G0(H)=−∞ for
some H ≤∞ . We impose this latter condition for technical convenience: it
insures the existence of an optimal house holding plan for all beliefs about house
prices satisfying the restriction that house prices cannot become negative. The
above assumptions imply that there is a bliss point HB such that G0(HB)=0 ,
with G0(H) ≥ 0 for H<H B and G0(H) ≤ 0 for H>H B. For reasons that
will become apparent below, the housing stock may exceed this bliss point in
equilibrium.
Using the consumption good as numeraire and letting qt denote the price of
houses, the agent’s ﬂow budget constraint is
ct +( Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1)qt + Rbt−1 + kt = yt + bt + πt + kt−1pt (4)
where yt ≥ 0 denotes an exogenous income process, bt the household’s new
loans, R the gross real interest rate on maturing loans bt−1, d ∈ [0,1) the rate
at which the housing stock depreciates, πt proﬁts from the ownership of (housing
development) ﬁrms, and kt ≥ 0 capital sold to competitive housing developers
who use this capital as an input for the production of new houses. This capital
stock fully depreciates in one period. To capture time lags in housing production
and for simplicity we assume that the price pt remunerating kt−1 is a competitive
forward price that is ﬁxed in period t − 1.
Note that we do not explicitly model a competitive rental market. This
is without loss of generality, as the rental market only determines the market
clearing rental price ξt. The remaining part of the paper, thus interprets ξt as
the rental price for housing services.







as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The parameter θ ∈ [0,1−d] captures the share
of houses owned by the household today that can serve as collateral to lenders.
A value of θ<1 thereby incorporates the eﬀects of physical depreciation of
houses, as well as the possibility that seizing the collateral in case of default is
costly for lenders.
The borrowing constraint (5) will be key to understand the model-implied
relation between house prices and current account dynamics. In a situation
with high expected future house price, current house prices will tend to be
high as well, and the borrowing constraint relatively loose. Agents can thus in-
crease international borrowing precisely at a time where house prices are high,
thereby establishing a connection between house price booms and current ac-
count deﬁcits.13
13This connection would be even more direct, if the collateral constraint determined the
maximum amount of borrowing as a function of the current instead of expected future housing
wealth. For our analysis such a change in the borrowing constraint would make virtually no
diﬀerence.
12We assume that the market for collateralized loans is internationally fully
integrated, so that the interest rate for such loans is determined by the ex-
ogenous world interest rate R ∈ (1, 1
δ). The latter implies that international
lenders are more patient than domestic households. In addition to simplifying
the analysis, it captures the presence of China and other emerging economies
as large and patient international lenders in the global economy. For simplicity,
foreign lenders are assumed to hold the same beliefs P as domestic agents.
Housing Supply. We now turn to the determinants of housing supply.
There exists a competitive housing development sector consisting of a unit mass
of housing development ﬁrms. The representative ﬁrm operates a decreasing
returns technology for constructing new houses. We assume that the amount of




with kt−1 ≥ 0 denoting the amount of development capital used by housing
developers and α ∈ (0,1). To capture time lags in housing construction we
assume that ﬁrms choose the level of input kt−1 in period t−1, i.e., one period
in advance.
Firms in the housing sector are owned by the consumer in the small open
economy, who receive proﬁts as lump sum transfers. Since ﬁrms do not have a
true intertemporal maximization problem (there is no state variable in the ﬁrms’










where pt is the price of period t inputs purchased from households in period























1−α denoting the elasticity of housing supply with respect to the expected
selling price EP
t−1qt. The housing stock then evolves according to
Ht =( 1− d)Ht−1 + S(EP
t−1qt,p t) (7)


















134.1 The Underlying Probability Space
We now describe details of the underlying the probability space (P,B,Ω).W e
let the state space of outcomes be given by
Ω ≡ Ωp × Ωq × Ωξ × Ωy × Ωπ
where ΩX =
Q∞
t=0 R+ is the space of possible inﬁnite sequences for the variable
X ∈ {p,q,ξ,y,π}. The probability space thus contains all possible sequences of
all payoﬀ-relevant variables that agents take as given, including prices, proﬁts
and exogenous shocks. The set of all possible histories up to period t for some
variable X is denoted by Ωt
X, and its typical element Xt ∈ Ωt
X, except for p
where Ωt






π denote the set of histories of all exogenous variables up to period
t,a n dωt ∈ Ωt its typical element. These beliefs P and the set Ω are assumed
common to all agents, including ﬁrms, domestic consumers and foreign agents.
T h ep r e v i o u ss e t u pi m p l i e st h a tr a t i o n a l agents condition their decisions on
the history of observed realizations, i.e., consumers choose for each t
(ct,h t,H t,b t,k t):Ωt → R5 .( 9 )
A key feature of this formulation is that agents do not treat prices (pt,q t) and
proﬁts πt as if they were given known function of the history of fundamentals
and therefore redundant condition variables, as is the case under rational ex-
pectations. Instead, agents treat prices just as another random variable among
all exogenous variables, because they do not necessarily know how a given his-
tory of fundamentals (y,ξ)t maps into prices and proﬁts. Agents express their
uncertainty about the joint distribution of prices and fundamentals using the
probability measure P. In the spirit of studying small deviations from rational
expectations, we will specify below a probability measure P that is close - but
not exactly equal - to the rational expectations beliefs.
4.2 Household Optimality Conditions
We now derive the conditions characterizing optimal household behavior. We
thereby proceed by assuming that a maximum for the household problem ex-
ists.14 First order conditions are then necessary and suﬃcient for household
optimality because the objective function is concave and the constraints are
linear in the households’ choices.
Households maximize the objective (1) subject to the constraints (3), (4)
and (5). Taking explicitly into account the non-negativity constraints for ct and
kt,the Lagrangian of the household problem is given by
14Existence of a maximum can be insured, for example, by imposing that the utility from
consumption (ct) is bounded at some very high level. See Appendix A.1 in Adam and Marcet















ct +( Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1)qt + bt−1R
+kt − yt − bt − πt − kt−1pt
¶
+γt(θEP
t qt+1Ht − Rbt)
+μtct + κtkt
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
where p0, k−1 and b−1 are given initial conditions.
The household’s ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) are
ct : λt =1+μt with μt ≥ 0 & ctμt =0 (10)
Ht : ξtG0(Ht) − λtqt + δ(1 − d)EP
t λt+1qt+1 + γtθEP
t qt+1 =0 (11)
bt : λt = δREP
t λt+1 + γtR
with γt ≥ 0 &
¡
θEP
t qt+1Ht − Rbt
¢
γt =0 (12)
kt : λt = δpt+1EP
t λt+1 + κt with κt ≥ 0 & ktκt =0 (13)
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (10) implies that λt ≥ 1.
We now describe the evolution of equilibrium variables. We focus on the case
where the collateral constraint (5) is binding for all periods t ≤ T +1 , where T
is the sample size, and the non-negativity constraints are never binding.15 In
this case, μt =0for all t =1 ,...,T so that the FOC (10) is satisﬁed for
λt =1





for all t. Using these results and equation (11) one obtains
qt = ρEP
t qt+1 + ξtG0(Ht) (14)
where




Given qt and EP
t qt+1, equation (14) determines the optimal amount of houses
demanded by the household. Since G0(·) continuously varies between +∞ and
−∞, this equation always has a solution for the optimal housing stock Ht,f o r
any given pair (qt,EP
t qt+1).M o r e o v e r , s i n c e Ht > 0 it conﬁrms our initial
conjecture of positive housing demand.
Importantly, for qt <
¡




t qt+1, equation (14) implies G0(Ht) <
0, so that housing demand exceeds the bliss point level HB. This is individu-
ally optimal because housing generates capital gains and relaxes the households’
15We discuss the equilibrium outcomes when the zero bound on consumption is binding in
appendix A.1. Since zero consumption does not accord well with the data, we focus in the text
on equilibria with positive consumption. In our model simulations we use parameterizations
for which the non-negativity constraint is not binding.
15borrow constraint, which allows to increase consumption. Therefore, whenever
houses are supposed to appreciate strongly in the future, it can become individ-
ually optimal to purchase housing above the bliss point.
When the collateral constraint is binding in the ﬁrst T +1periods, the




The capital oﬀered by the consumer to housing developers is only restricted to
satisfy
(1 − δpt+1)kt =0
so that either pt = δ
−1 or kt =0 . This means that if non-negativity constraints
are non-binding capital and consumption are not uniquely determined, the agent
is indiﬀerent between increasing slightly the capital sold to ﬁrms at t in exchange
for δ
−1 more units of consumption tomorrow. Since ﬁrms will have a positive
demand for k market clearing occurs at
pt = δ
−1 (17)
with capital supply by consumer being perfectly elastic, so that kt is determined
by ﬁrms’ demand.
Finally, consumption can be obtained residually from the ﬂow budget
ct = yt + bt + πt − (Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1)qt − bt−1R − kt + kt−1δ
−1 (18)
where we imposed (17).
4.3 Equilibrium Dynamics for General Beliefs P
For arbitrary and given beliefs P, the equilibrium evolution of the house price
qt and the housing stock Ht must satisfy equations (14) and (7), rewritten here
as
qt = ρEP
t qt+1 + ξtG0(Ht) (19)
Ht+1 =( 1− d)Ht + S(EP
t qt+1,δ
−1) (20)
These equations can be solved for the process {qt,H t}
∞
t=0. Borrowing then
follows from equation (16), housing supply from (6), proﬁts from (8) and equi-
librium consumption from (18).
5 Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
We now assume that agents entertain rational expectations (EP
t [·]=Et[·])a n d
derive the resulting REE in the case that the collateral constraint is always
binding.16 We start by determining the deterministic steady state, then ana-
lyze the eﬀects of preference and income shocks, and ﬁnally discuss the eﬀects
16This can be insured by choosing suﬃciently high values for the endowments {yt} or
suﬃciently low values for θ.
16of changes in international real interest rates. As will become clear from the
discussion below, under RE the model has great diﬃculties in replicating the
observed house price dynamics.
5.1 Deterministic Steady State
We start out by determining the deterministic steady state, i.e., the REE in
which ξt = ξ and yt = y for all t. Letting variables without time subscripts











which jointly determine a unique steady state value for qss and Hss.17 Steady

















We now analyze the eﬀects of shocks to housing preferences ξt and household
income yt. In the interest of deriving closed form approximate solutions we
consider solutions of (34) and (35) when the function G(·) is linearized around
its steady state. We discuss the additional eﬀects arising from the concavity of
G(·) separately below.
Substituting G0(Ht) by G0(Hss) in equation (34) implies that the REE house














=l n1+l nεt (24)
17Existence and uniqueness follow from the following considerations. Equation (21) deﬁnes
q as a continuous and (weakly) decreasing function of H which approaches +∞ as H → 0 and
−∞ as H → H.F r o m( 2 2 )w eh a v et h a tq is a strictly increasing function of H.A sar e s u l t
there exist a unique intersection.
17For the linear approximation we thus have EtqRE
t+1 = qRE
t and pt = δ
−1,s ot h a t
the housing stock approximately evolves according to:18
HRE









The previous ﬁndings show that preference and income shocks both fail to aﬀect
the price-to-rent ratio (23) and that the real house price follows a unit root in
this approximate REE. Therefore, under RE preference and income shock can
neither explain the large swings in the price-to-rent ratio and are unlikely to
explain the persistent boom and bust patterns in real house prices observed in
the data.
Preference shocks also cannot explain the observed house price dynamics
when taking into account the concavity in G (G00(HSS) < 0). Concavity implies
that any expansion of the housing stock, following a positive innovation to
housing preferences, leads to a reduction in G0 over time. Therefore, the house
price will increase less on impact and also decreases with time as the housing
stock expands. Moreover, equation (34) implies that on impact and in the long-
run the price-to-rent ratio decreases. Real house prices and the price-to-rent
ratio will thus move in opposite directions, while the data both measures are
positively correlated.19
5.3 The Eﬀects of Changes in Real Interest Rates
We now consider the eﬀects of unexpected changes in the real interest rate for
the RE house price. Equation (23) shows that a reduction in real interest rates
generates an increase in the real house price and the price-to-rent ratio. Yet,
as we document below, a RE setting it is unlikely that changes in real interest
rate can properly account for the observed house price dynamics.
To analyze the eﬀects of real interest rate changes we assume that the econ-
omy starts from a steady state position in the year 2000. We then subject it
to the stylized changes in the real interest rate indicated by the dashed line in
ﬁgure 2. Speciﬁcally, we consider a persistent and unexpected decrease in the
real rate in the year 2001, followed by an equally unexpected real rate increase
in the year 2006.20 The eﬀects of anticipated real rate changes will be discussed
separately below.
We parameterize the rest of the model as follows. We set θ =0 .26,w h i c h
is the 1996-2005 average of the annual value change change the U.S. housing
18The subsequent equation reveals that suﬃciently small housing perference shocks will
indeed imply that Ht stays in the neighborhood of H with high likelihood, as initially assumed.
19We consider this case formally in appendix A.2, which derives the REE for a quadratic
approximation to G.
20The initial real interest rate is set equal to the average ex-ante gross real mortgage rate over
the periods 1996-2000, i.e., R96−00 =1 .0335. In the year 2001 we then consider an expected
and permanent fall in the real interest rate that lasts for 5 years to a value of R01−05 =1 .0228,
which is equal to the average ex-ante U.S. real mortgage rate for this period. Thereafter, we
consider an unexpected and permanent upward shift in real rates to R06−08 =1 .0301,w h i c h
is again taken from the data.











All interest rate changes unanticipated
Anticipated increase in 2006
Figure 6: RE dynamics of the real house price (stylized real interest rate path
from ﬁgure 2)
stock over the current account deﬁcit, see table 1. For the annual discount
factor we choose δ =0 .96, so that the discount factor is slightly below the real
interest rate path that we feed into the model.21 Finally, we set the annual
house depreciation rate equal to d =3 % . None of the shown results proves
particularly sensitive to the assumed parameter values.
To simplify the analysis, we ﬁrst consider again solution with a linear approx-
imation, i.e., we assume G0(Ht)=G0(Hss) over the relevant range of housing
stock values Ht. The behavior arising with G00 < 0 is still to be written. We
keep housing preference shocks constant at ξt = ξ and normalize ξG0(H) such
that the initial steady state real house price in the year 2000 (prior to any change
in the real interest rate) is equal to 100.
The resulting REE real house price dynamics from unexpected changes in the
interest rate are illustrated by the upper line in ﬁgure 6.22 The ﬁgure reveals
that RE imply that house price changes occur simultaneously with unantici-
pated changes in real interest rates. For the U.S. economy, however, one cannot
ﬁnd a close simultaneous association between changes in the real mortgage rates
and house prices changes. Mortgage rates, for example, stayed approximately
constant between the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2005, see ﬁgure 2,
while house prices increased strongly over these two years. Likewise, real mort-
gage rates were roughly constant over the years 2006-2008, while house prices
decreased considerably over these years. Due to this close association with in-
21This is required to insure optimality of the binding collateral constraint.
22Since ξt = ξ, the price-to-rent ratio is simply proportional to the real house price series.´
19terest rates, house prices under RE do not exhibit the persistence that can be
observed for house price ﬂuctuations in the data.
Furthermore, the amplitude of the ﬂuctuations generated by interest rate
shocks tends to be small compared to the data. The RE model justiﬁes a
4% appreciation between 2000 and 2005, while the U.S. experienced a tenfold
increase over this period. From a RE viewpoint, it thus appears diﬃcult to
account for the observed house price dynamics using changes in real interest
rates as a driving force.
Even greater diﬃculties arise if one assumes instead that agents fully antic-
ipate future changes in real interest rates, instead of assuming that any given
change is considered permanent. If agents anticipate the 2006 real interest rate
increase, then house prices evolve according to the lower line shown in ﬁgure
6. The initial house price increase in 2001 is then even smaller and followed by
a gradual decrease, due to the anticipated real rate increase (and house price
decrease) in the year 2006. In the data, however, house prices increased strongly
after the year 2001.
We can conclude that under RE it is diﬃcult to account for the U.S. house
price dynamics using the observed interest rate dynamics. Rather than pre-
dicting house price increases over the years 2001-2006, RE predicts that house
prices move together with interest rates, that ﬂuctuations are fairly small and
that house price persistence is relatively low.
6S p e c i f y i n g N e a r R E E B e l i e f s
We now consider rational agents who hold subjective beliefs about the house
price process. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, agents are assumed
to know that the joint distribution over exogenous shocks and market prices has
a singularity and where exactly this singularity is located.23 Yet, even expert
economists rarely agree on the correct economic model linking fundamentals to
prices. Therefore, it appears of interest to relax the assumption that agents
know the correct model of prices and to consider instead agents who do not
know exactly how prices behave.
We assume that agents express uncertainty about the true price process by
formulating a perceived joint distribution over prices and fundamentals. We
formulate this joint distribution with the aid of a perceived model of price be-
havior for which agents do not know exactly the parameters. And in the spirit
of analyzing small departures from rational expectations beliefs, we parame-
terize beliefs so that beliefs of learning agents approach (in distribution) those
entertained by agents in a linearized REE in which interest rates are constant.
We now describe the probability beliefs and then show how these approach
the beliefs held in the corresponding REE.
The probability space (B,Ω) is as deﬁned in section 4.1. To simplify the
analysis we assume that agents have very good information about all variables
except housing prices, which is the variable we are interested in. In particular,
23Models of learning about fundamentals also often make this assumption implicitly.
20we assume that agents hold rational expectations about the exogenous processes
{yt,ξt}∞
t=0 and about {pt = δ
−1}∞
t=0.24 We relax, however, the assumption of
rational house price expectations.
Speciﬁcally, we relax the assumption that agents believe that average house
price growth is constant over time, as in the corresponding REE outcome (24).
Instead, we allow for a persistent house price growth component βt, in addition





=l nβt +l nvt (25)
This relaxation relative to the REE outcome (24) is motivated by the empirical
evidence on house price behavior, which displays periods of persistently increas-
ing prices (lnβt > 0 for a number of periods) and periods of persistently falling
prices (lnβt < 0 for a number of periods). Agent’s beliefs about house price
growth implied by (25) will be close to REE beliefs (in distribution) whenever
agents belief that lnβt ≈ ln1 with high likelihood.
For simplicity, we shall assume that the persistent component follows a ran-
dom walk 25
lnβt =l nβt−1 +l nηt (26)


















The views implied by (25)-(27) then represent a small deviation form the REE
beliefs, whenever the variance of the drift term σ2
η is very small, so that lnβt be-
haves almost like a constant, and if agents’ initial beliefs about lnβ0 is centered
with high precision at its corresponding REE value, i.e., lnβ0 ≈ ln1 with high
likelihood, see equation (24). We shall impose conditions insuring this property
below.
A learning problem arises in the present setting because agents observe the
history of realized house price growth
qt
qt−1, but not the terms βt and vt sepa-
rately. Therefore, agents optimally update their beliefs about βt in the light of
new data about house price growth.




24Since the process for yt and ξt are exogenous to the model, it is straightforward to relax
this assumption for these variables.
25The fact that βt is non-stationary is not important for our results. The model outcome
are almost the same when specifying instead a stationary process
lnβt =( 1− ρ)+ρlnβt−1 +l nηt
and choosing some value ρ<1 that is suﬃciently close to one.
21and σ2












The prior beliefs (28) together with the process (25)-(27) completely specify
agents’ beliefs about house price behavior.
We can complete the overall belief description by assuming that agents know
how to map a history of prices into proﬁts. In other words, agents know that
proﬁts in t are given by a function π(EP
t−1qt,q t) equal to the right-hand side of
(8) for pt = δ
−1. This completes the description of P.
We now impose restrictions on P so that agents’ beliefs approach (in distribu-
tion) the REE beliefs about the price process under the linearization considered.
We do this in two steps. First, we center initial beliefs so as to be consistent
with no growth in real house prices by choosing lnm0 =l n1 . Second, we con-
sider the case when beliefs are such that σ2
η → 0. As a result of this second
assumption, prior uncertainty σ0 about price growth vanishes (σ2
0 → 0).A g e n t s
thus become increasingly certain about the fact that log house price growth is
equal to zero. Formally, as σ2
0 → 0 their beliefs about prices converge to REE
beliefs in distribution (or ‘in law’). Below, we shall consider small but positive
values for ση so that our agents entertain prior beliefs that are close to (but not
equal) to the beliefs that give rise to the REE.
6.1 Internal Rationality and Discounted Sums
It appears to be a commonly held view among academic economists that rational
behavior leaves no room for independent beliefs about prices, because ‘rational-
ity implies that agents know how to formulate prices as discounted sums of
future fundamentals’. As discussed extensively in Adam and Marcet (2010a),
this widespread view is incorrect, once agents do not know exactly the features
of all other agents in the economy.
This view is equally incorrect for the housing model studied in the present
paper. As we show below, agents fail to hold enough knowledge to formulate
prices as a discounted sum involving only beliefs about fundamentals. In other
words, agents cannot derive a mapping linking prices to the history of dividends
through a pure process of deductive reasoning. This can be most easily demon-
strated for the case where the non-negativity constraint on consumption is never
binding, so that (14) holds each period. Forward iteration on this equation then






which holds under internal rationality. Importantly, this discounted sum in-
volves beliefs about future housing decisions (Ht+j), in addition to beliefs about
future fundamentals (ξt+j). And the agent’s optimal housing plan {Ht+j} will
22depend on the agents’ price beliefs. The belief system P, however, does not al-
low to express these price beliefs as a function of the agent’s beliefs about future
fundamentals. Therefore, price beliefs play an independent role for determining
the value of the discounted sum (29).
7 Equilibrium Dynamics with Learning
We now explore the equilibrium dynamics in an economy in which agents hold
the near REE beliefs P speciﬁed in the previous section. We ﬁrst derive the
evolution of the conditional house price growth expectations mt implied by the
probability measure P, then discuss the resulting price dynamics
7.1 Belief Updating
Bayesian updating of beliefs implies that agents’ posterior beliefs about βt at
time t are given by
lnβt ∼ N(lnmt,σ2
0)
where lnmt evolves recursively according to





























with mt evolving according to equation (30). Furthermore, to avoid simultaneity
between price expectations and price outcomes, it is convenient to assume that
information on prices is introduced with a delay in mt, so that we actually use








A microfounded belief system justifying this delay is provided in proposition 2
in Adam and Marcet (2010a).
7.2 Qualitative Behavior of Equilibrium Prices under Learn-
ing
This section discusses the qualitative behavior of equilibrium house prices under
learning. As before, we consider again the approximate solution when linearizing
23G around its steady state value, so that take G0 is constant. The asset pricing














For the case with vanishing prior uncertainty (σ2
η,σ2
0 → 0), the gain g is small
so that mt changes only slowly from period to period. Beliefs then remain close
to mt =1for all t and the above price is well deﬁned because ρ<1.
The key feature of house prices under learning is that there is feedback
between expectations of price growth and actual price growth. Equation (32)
shows that higher expected growth mt leads to higher price and thus realized
price growth, which in turn increases the expectations tomorrow via the belief
updating rule. Therefore, the model has the potential to generate price booms
that are fueled by the interaction between expectations and realized prices.
This can formally be shown by combining (33) and (31) to obtain a non-linear
second order diﬀerence equation governing the behavior of mt. The dynamics
of this diﬀerence equation are very similar to those described in section 4.2.1 of
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010) for stock prices. The previous paper shows
that price changes display momentum locally around the REE value , i.e., once
prices start growing (falling), there is a tendency for prices to continue growing
(falling), as well as there being mean reversion in the longer-run.
House price increases will come to an end when realized house price growth
falls short of the expected price growth. Equation (33) shows that this occurs
whenever the increase in price growth optimism becomes too weak to sustain
the high level of price growth expectations. For example, if mt is very high, but
stays constant from one period to the next (mt = mt−1), then equation (33)
implies that realized price growth is equal to 1 on average, i.e., falls short of
expectations. This sets in motion a sequence of downward belief revisions that
lead to a price bust. Alternatively, upward price dynamics can come to an end
if there is an increase in real interest rates that causes house prices to increase
less than initially expected, or a negative shock to housing preferences.26 As
a result of the initial disappointment, there will be a decrease in price growth
expectations, thereby a further fall in house prices, triggering a sequence of
downward belief revisions.
The model thus has the potential to generate a house price boom which
eventually will lead to a bust.
26For the general case where G is strictly concave, the upward dynamics may also come to
a halt if the increase in the housing stock associated with high house prices levels leads to a
fall in G0.
247.3 The Qualitative Response to Interest Rates Changes
We now explore the eﬀects of an unanticipated decrease in real interest rates in
period t.27 Equation (33) implies that realized house price growth in period t
increases as a result of a reduction in real interest rates.28 The price increase is
thereby stronger for an economy in which agents in period t are more optimistic
about future price growth (in which mt is higher).
After a fall in real interest rates, the initial increase in realized price growth
will feed into future beliefs about price growth via the belief updating equation
(31). Due to momentum this leads to a sequence of further increase in realized
price growth.
Importantly, interest rates are not the only determinant of whether or not
a price boom occurs. If the house price in a given country has been increasing
already before the reduction in interest rates, then the interest rate reduction
will make it more likely that the house price boom will continue in this country.
Conversely, in a country where the house prices have been decreasing, the inter-
est rate reduction may only ameliorate the decrease in house prices. Therefore
the model is consistent with the observation that house price booms are not
synchronized across countries, even though interest rates behave in a similar
way.
A house price boom also relaxes the collateral constraint and leads to an





House price increases are thus associated with increased international borrowing,
i.e., a current account deﬁcit. Provided investment in new houses is not too
elastic, the house price boom will also be associated with a consumption boom.
Finally, from equation (6) follows that an increase in expected house price
growth leads to an increase in the production of new houses, thereby qualita-
tively matching the observation about new housing supply displayed in Figure
4. Admittedly, the model cannot reproduce the asymmetric and sharp decline
in new houses after the year 2006. Given the simplicity of the model, however,
this should be hardly surprising.
Qualitatively, the model thus has the potential to explain a housing boom,
that is associated with a current account deﬁcit, a consumption increase and an
increase in the production of new housing units. The next sections explore the
ability of the learning model to quantitatively account for the real house price
and current account dynamics in the U.S. and the remaining G7 economies.
27Technically, the change in the real interest rate is a probability zero event under the
postulated beliefs.
28T h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee n t e r si nt h ed e ﬁnition of ρ, see equation (15)
258 The U.S. Experience: 2001-2008
We now calibrate the learning model to the U.S. economy and show that it
can quantitatively replicate the real house price and current account develop-
ments for the U.S. economy over the years 2001-2008. The performance for the
remaining G7 economies is analyzed in the next section.
We use as data inputs the history of real house prices over the years 1996-
2000 and the stylized path for real interest rates of the years 2001-2008, as
captured by the dashed line in ﬁgure 2.29 Except for the stylized information
about the real interest rate, the predictions we show below do not use any data
after the year 2000.
As in section 5.3, we choose θ =0 .26, δ =0 .96 and d =3 % .W es e tt h ei n i t i a l
price growth expectations in 1996 to be consistent with stable house prices, as
in a REE, i.e., we choose m1996 =1 . We then use the belief updating equation
(31) from the model to impute house price beliefs for the year 2000 (m2000).
We do this using as inputs the assumed initial belief and the real house price
growth observation from the U.S. data. The choice of the gain parameter g is
explained below.
We then use m2000 and the real interest rate R1996−2000 to compute the
equilibrium real house price for the year 2000. We thereby normalize the equi-
librium real house price in the year 2000 to 100 by choosing the value of ξG0(H)
correspondingly.30 We then use the model to generate the a predicted real house
price for the years 2001-2008, using as inputs only the interest rate decrease for
the years 2001-2005 and the increase for the years 2006-2008.
We then choose the gain parameter g in the belief updating equation (31)
to minimize the absolute distance between the model implied prediction for the
real house price and the data. This leads to a annual gain of g =0 .06,w h i c h
implies that agents believe that on average 94% of any observed annual house
price increase is transitory in nature.
Figure 7 reports the model-predicted outcome jointly with the U.S. real
house price series for the years 2000-2008. The model shows that the decrease
in real interest rates in the year 2001 gives rise to an initial increase in the real
house price. Since realized price increases feed positively into future beliefs via
the updating equation, the initial increase will be followed by further upward
price movements, giving rise to a house price boom. The increase comes to
an end in the year 2006 when interest rates move up again, causing the house
price to slowly revert direction, in line with the data. The resulting downward
revision in beliefs then sets in motion a sequence of price reductions.
Figure 7 also depicts the model predicted counterfactual house price path
29Speciﬁcally, for the years 1996-2000 we set real interest rates equal to the average ex-ante
gross real mortgage rate, i.e., R96−00 =1 .0335. To capture the real interest rate decrease
following in years 2001-2005, we set real interest to R01−05 =1 .0228, which is again the
average ex-ante U.S. real mortgage rate for this period in the data. Finally, we capture the
upward shift in real rates in the years 2006-2008 by setting R06−08 =1 .0301, which is again
taken from the data.
30We keep ξG0(H) ﬁxed at this calibrated value in all subsequent model periods. The value
for ξG0(H) only normalizes the house price level, but has no impact on the dynamics.












Figure 7: US real house prices: model predictions, data and counterfactual
that would be obtained if real interest rates in the years 2001-2008 remained
at their pre 2001 average.31 House prices would then have increased only very
mildly. A small increase would have occurred nevertheless, simply because of the
positive price momentum that existed already prior to the year 2000. Overall,
the model is consistent with the view that the US housing price boom was
mostly caused by interest rates being too low for too long.
The current account dynamics implied by the housing boom in ﬁgure 7 de-
pend partly on the long-run housing supply elasticity ( α
1−α), because housing
can be used as collateral in international borrowing. For their preferred speciﬁ-
cation, Topel and Sherwin (1988) estimate a long-run housing supply elasticity
of 3 for the United States. Since there is considerable uncertainty about this
parameter, we allow for values between 1 and 5 and choose the long-run elastic-
ity that minimizes the absolute distance between the model predicted current
account deﬁcit ratio and the current account deﬁcit ratio in the data.32 The
model then prefers a relative elastic supply with α
1−α =5 . Figure 8 depicts
the current account ratio in the data and the one implied by the model. The
model predicts well the deterioration of the U.S. current account over the years
2001-2005, but overpredicts the improvements following the house price collapse
after 2005. Overall, the quantitative performance of the model is surprisingly
31Gross ex-ante real interest rates are then assumed to stay constant at their 1996-2000
average, which is R96−00 =1 .0335.
32To obtain a model-implied current account to GDP ratio, one also has to take a stand
on the exogenous income process. We choose a time-invariant income, i.e., yt = y,s ot h a t
income ﬂuctuations do not contribute to explaining variations in the model-implied current
acount to GDP ratio. We then choose the level of y so as to minimize the sum of absolute
distances between model-predicted current account to GDP ration and the data.












Figure 8: US current account deﬁcit ratio: model predicted and data
good, given that it abstracts from many other factors relevant for the current
account, for example, ﬁscal borrowing.
Figure 8 also depicts the counterfactual reaction of the current account if
real interest rate had stayed at their 1996-2000 average. The model predicts
that large part of the current account surplus would not have occurred, had
interest rates not decreased after the year 2000. The is the result of a lower
volume and a lower value of collateral in the absence of a price and construction
boom.
9 Other G7 Economies: 2001-2008
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the real house price
and current dynamics over the years 2001-2008 in the remaining G7 economies.
9.1 Real House Price Dynamics
We tie our hands by using he same model parameterization as for the U.S.
economy.33 We also subject each of the G7 economies to the same stylized
interest rate path as the U.S. economy, which amounts to interpreting the U.S.
real mortgage rate as a proxy for international real interest rates. Clearly, this
33This is true, except for the value of ξG0, which is chosen in each country to normalize the
model-implied real house prices in the year 2000 to 100. As is apparent from equations (32)
and (33), the choice of ξG0 does not aﬀect the model dynamics.


















































Figure 9: Other G7 economies: models-predicted real house prices and real
house price data
29approach biases results against us, as we could instead choose to parameterize
the model for each country so as to achieve the best possible ﬁt with the data.
As we show below, the model nevertheless performs surprisingly well.
It is important to note that countries diﬀer, although we use the same para-
meterization as for the US economy. This is the case because agents entertain
diﬀerent beliefs at the time of the real interest rate decrease. As before, these
beliefs are computed using the belief updating equation (31) and by assuming
that initial beliefs in 1996 are consistent with no house price growth (m1996 =1
in each country). The diﬀerent country-speciﬁc house price histories then lead
to diﬀerent imputed beliefs for the year 2000. We thereby use the same gain
parameter (g =0 .06) as for the US economy for all countries, except for the
U.K. where we use a slightly smaller gain value of g =0 .046 because house
price dynamics become unstable for the U.S. parameterization.34 For none of
the countries (except for the UK), we use information on price behavior after
the year 2000.
The outcome of this exercise is depicted in 9. The ﬁgure illustrates that our
model predicts strong house price increases for France, Italy, and the U.K., in
line with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts much more muted
increases for Germany and Japan than for these ﬁr s tc o u n t r i e s ,a l b e i ti td o e s
not replicate the observed fall in house prices in these countries. Real house
prices in Germany and Japan have been falling prior to the year 2000, so that
the presence of momentum implies that agents’ price growth expectations tend
to decrease further. The interest rate reduction turns this negative momentum
into some slight positive momentum. For the case with Canada, the model
predicts a house price boom, but underpredicts its size, especially at the end of
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
The second row of table 5 below reports the annual cross-sectional correlation
between the model-predicted real house price and the real house price in the
data. The table shows that this correlation is very high in each year. The model
thus accounts surprisingly well for the asynchronous low frequency movements
in house prices, even though we subject all economies to the same interest rate
shocks.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Real House Price 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.77
Table 5: Yearly cross-sectional correlation between model-predicted and
actual real house price for the G7 economies
9.2 Current Account Dynamics
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the current ac-
count dynamics for the remaining G7 economies. As is clear from ﬁgure 9, the
34We choose the gain parameter for the U.K. so as to minimize the sum of absolute diﬀer-
ences between the model predicted house price and the data over the years 2001-2008.
































Figure 10: Model-predicted and actual current account ratios: matching the
levels
































Figure 11: Model-predicted and actual current account ratios: matching the
trend
32model will have diﬃculties in explaining the level of the current account for Ger-
many, Japan and Canada. For these countries the model predicts house price
booms (albeit small ones for Germany and Japan) and therefore initially cur-
rent account deﬁcits, while the data display current account surpluses for these
economies throughout the considered period. Given this, we explore below also
the ability of the model to account for the trend in the G7 current accounts over
time.
Figure 10 reports the model-predicted outcomes, when seeking to match the
level of the current account to GDP ratio in each country. We thereby employ
the same method for matching the data as for the US economy. As expected,
the ﬁgure shows that the model fails to replicate the evidence for Germany,
Japan and Canada.35 At the same time, the model does a fairly good job in
replicating the evidence for France, Italy and the U.K.36
Figure 11 reports the outcome when we seek to match instead the trend in the
current account ratios. We achieve this by allowing for a time-invariant unex-
plained level component c in the current account ratio of each country.37 Figure
11 shows that the model then performs surprisingly well for all G7 economies,
especially the performance for Germany, Japan and Canada improves consid-
erably. Table 6 below reports the parameters values for the long-run supply
elasticity (a/(1−α)) and the unexplained level component (c)u s e di nﬁgure 11.
For France, Italy and the U.K. the required level variable is relatively small. For
Germany, Japan and Canada there is a positive (unexplained) level component
in the current account and housing supply is estimated to be rather inelastic.
Overall, ﬁgure 11 shows that our simple model can successfully account for
the trends in the G7 current account ratios over the years 2001-2008.
Japan Germany France Italy U.K. Canada
α/(1 − α) 1155 4.4 1
c (relative to GDP) 0.037 0.051 0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.016
Table 6: Long-run supply elasticity and unexplained level
in CA/GDP ratio
10 Conclusions
A simple model of learning can quantitatively account for the G7 house price
developments over the recent housing boom and bust period. While the model
has diﬃculties in explaining the level of the current account ratios of some
35Since the matching procedure seeks to minimize the sum of absolute distances, it chooses
a very high value for the income process y, so that the model predicted current account to
GDP ratio is zero for these countries.
36The implied long-run housing supply elasticity, α/(1 − α),i se q u a lt o5i nF r a n c ea n d
Italy and equal to 4 in the U.K.
37We then choose in each country the long-run supply elasticity α
1−α ∈ [1,5],t h et i m e -
invariant income y, and a time-invariant current accout level variable c, so as to minimize
t h es u mo ft h ea b s o l u t ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h em o d e lp r e d i c t e dc u r r e n ta c c o u n tr a t i oa n dt h e
current account ratio in the data, when adding c to each diﬀerence term in the sum.
33countries, it does surprisingly well in replicating all the G7 current account
trends.
Our model predicts that a fall in the level of the real interest rate can fuel
a persistent and long lasting increase in real house prices. Whether or not such
a boom materializes depends, however, crucially on the degree to which agents
expect future capital gains already, i.e., on the past price dynamics and shocks
hitting the economy.
T h em o d e ls u g g e s t st h a th o u s ep r i c eb o o m sc a ng i v er i s et oi m p o r t a n tw e l -
fare distortions because they lead to an over-extension of the housing stock. It
thus appears of interest to explore to what extent policy instruments, e.g., ad-
justments in the permissible leverage ratio, could be used to prevent an overly
large build-up of the housing stock. The welfare eﬀects of a house price boom
thereby depend not only on the size and duration of the house price increase,
but also on the underlying elasticity of housing supply.
A Appendix
A.1 Non-negativity constraints on consumption
We now determine the behavior of the model when the non-negativity con-
straints on consumption are binding. For expositional clarity we discuss here
the non-stochastic case only.
In the main text we supposed that the collateral constraint is binding in all
periods. As we show now, this could lead to a violation of the non-negativity
constraint on consumption whenever income yt is not high enough. Consider,
for example, a case when EP
j qj+1Hj is very high at j = t and very low at
j = t +1 . If borrowing is at the collateral limit in both periods, then this
implies a large decrease in debt at t+1.A n di fi n c o m eyt+1 is not high enough,
this would require negative consumption in t +1 . The optimal solution then
cannot have the feature that the collateral constraint is binding periods t and
t +1simultaneously.
In such a situation one can determine the optimal solution as follows. One
can suppose that the non-negativity constraint on consumption is binding only
in period t +1but not binding in period t,s ot h a tw eh a v eγt =0 . From the
non-binding zero limit in t we have λt =1and from (12) we obtain λt+1 > 1,
as δR < 1, so that indeed ct+1 =0 . The binding borrowing constraint at t +1
then determines bt+1. Using this and the fact that ct+1 =0one obtains bt from
the budget constraint at t +1 .T h e v a l u e f o r ct then follows from the budget
constraint at t.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eγt+1 > 0 we can have (12) holding and λt+2 =1
so that μt+2 =0and ct+2 > 0,s ot h a tf r o mt +2onwards we are back in the
case analyzed in the main text where consumption is positive and the collateral
constraint is binding.
If the previous solution would still imply negative consumption in t,t h e n
one would have to extend the approach to a setting where consumption is zero
for more than one period, say between periods t +1 ,... ,t+ n.I nt h i sc a s ew e
34would have that the collateral constraint being non-binding for n periods, i.e.,
for periods t,...,t + n − 1 and one could work backwards to derive a candidate
solution in the same manner as described above. Again, after period t + n one
would be back in the setting analyzed in the main text.
A.2 Linear-quadratic approximation
The main text studies the approximate equilibrium outcomes when linearizing
G(·) around its steady state value. This simpliﬁes the analysis and allows us
to relate the analysis to results derived in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010).
We now extend the analysis to a quadratic approximation of G(·). Besides
increasing the order of the approximation, this is of interest because it introduces
an interaction between housing prices and the level of housing construction.
Considering concavity in G(·) is also useful because it makes it less likely that
explosive paths for prices will arise under learning: as house prices and new
construction increases, the marginal value of housing services G0(Ht) decreases,
which exerts a dampening eﬀect on the upward prices dynamics under learning.
We show below that the unique locally non-explosive rational expectations
(RE) solution then takes the form
b qt = aREb ξt + bRE b Ht
b Ht+1 = cRE b Ht + dREb ξt
where hatted variables denote deviations from the steady state and
¡
aRE,b RE,c RE,d RE¢
are given coeﬃcients satisfying aRE > 0, bRE < 0, 0 <c RE < 1 and dRE > 0.
We now derive a ﬁrst order accurate approximation to the rational expecta-





+( 1− d − θ)δ
¶
EP
t qt+1 + ξtG0(Ht) (34)
Ht+1 =( 1− d)Ht + S(EP
t qt+1,δ
−1) (35)
We linearize these equations around some steady state (q,H,ξ), i.e., around a
point solving the above system of equation for qt = q,Ht = H and ξt = ξ for all
t. Letting hatted variables again denote deviations from steady state values, a
ﬁrst order approximation to (34) delivers
b qt = ρEP
t b qt+1 + G0b ξt + ξG00 b Ht (36)
where, as in the text, ρ =
¡ θ
R +( 1− d − θ)δ
¢
and with all derivatives evaluated
at the steady state. A linearization of (35) delivers
b Ht+1 =( 1− d) b Ht + S0EP
t qt+1 (37)
We now conjecture a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
b qt = ab ξt + b b Ht
35With RE and using the law of motion for ξt we have
Etb qt+1 = ab ξt + bEt b Ht+1 (38)
Substituting into (37) delivers
b Ht+1 =( 1− d) b Ht + S0(ab ξt + bEt b Ht+1)
Taking the expectations Et of this equation delivers







so that (38) implies























Equation coeﬃcients in the ALM and PLM delivers two conditions for aRE and
bRE given by
aRE = ρaRE + ρ
S0aREbRE
1 − S0bRE + G0
bRE = ρ
(1 − d)bRE
1 − S0bRE + ξG00
The second equation depends only on bRE but is quadratic, the ﬁrst is linear in
aRE, conditional on bRE.
0=S0 ¡
bRE¢2
+( −1+ρ(1 − d) − S0ξG00)bRE + ξG00
which has two solutions
b∗
1 =
(1 − ρ(1 − d)+S0ξG00)+
q





(1 − ρ(1 − d)+S0ξG00) −
q
(−1+ρ(1 − d) − S0ξG00)
2 − 4S0ξG00
2S0









36From (37) and (40) follows that the dynamics for b Ht are given by
b Ht+1 =( 1 − d) b Ht + S0EP
t qt+1


























Since 1 >d>0,w eh a v et h a tS0b∗
i < 0 is a suﬃcient condition for the dynamics
for b Ht to be locally non-explosive. It is easy to show that the solution (a∗
2,b ∗
2)
is non-explosive while (a∗
1,b ∗








equation (42). As we show in the next section, show there exists no other
locally non-explosive RE equilibrium.
A.2.1 Local Uniqueness of the RE Solution
We now show that there exists no other locally non-explosive RE solution than
the one derived in the previous section. We bring the linearized equation (37)






















































which is a system with one predetermined and one ‘jump’ variable. It has a
locally unique REE if the ﬁrst matrix on the right-hand side has one explosive





ρ − dρ − ξG00S0 +1+
q
(ρ − dρ − ξG00S0 +1 )






ρ − dρ − ξG00S0 +1−
q
(ρ − dρ − ξG00S0 +1 )
2 +4 ρ(d − 1)
¶
It is straightforward to show that λ1 is unstable (λ1 > 1) while λ2 is a stable
eigenvalue (−1 <λ 2 < 1).
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